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Scuttling IUU Fishing and Rewarding Sustainable 
Fishing: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Port State 
Measures Agreement with Trade-Related Measures 
Anastasia Telesetsky* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing) is a sub-
stantial threat to global food security and a recurring problem for global 
fishery managers already facing difficult baseline situations exacerbated 
by climate change, including warming oceans and increasing acidifica-
tion. There is nothing historically new about IUU fishing; there have al-
ways been poachers who take advantage of operating in the shadows of 
legal commercial fishing.1 What is new is the extent to which marine 
poaching has industrialized. It is estimated that 19% of the worldwide 
value of marine catches are unlawful.2 The problem is not limited to de-
veloping states. For example, even though the United States, through the 
work of the U.S. Coast Guard, has been actively combatting IUU fishing 
for decades, all is not well at U.S. ports. A 2014 study found that up to 
32% of wild-caught seafood, including shrimp, crab, salmon, pollock, 
and tuna, imported into the United States may be illegally harvested.3 
                                                        
* Anastasia Telesetsky is an Associate Professor at the University of Idaho College of Law. She 
would like to thank the organizers of the Seattle University Law Review symposium and the  
editorial staff for their hard work and professionalism in preparing this symposium edition. She 
would especially like to thank Professor Gregory Shaffer for his valuable feedback on this paper at 
the international trade and investment law workshop generously sponsored by the Center on Global-
ization, Law, and Society at the University of California Irvine School of Law.   
 1. See, e.g., CALLUM ROBERTS, THE UNNATURAL HISTORY OF THE SEA 133 (2008) (describing 
the continued use of trawling in eighteenth-century England in spite of limitations placed on the 
practice). 
 2 . EUROPEAN COMM’N, HANDBOOK ON THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF COUNCIL 
REGULATION (EC) NO. 1005/2008 OF 29 SEPTEMBER 2008 ESTABLISHING A COMMUNITY SYSTEM 
TO PREVENT, DETER AND ELIMINATE ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING 6 (2009), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/illegal_fishing/info/handbook_original_en.pdf. 
 3. Ganapathiraju Pramod et al., Estimates of Illegal and Unreported Fish in Seafood Imports to 
the USA, 48 MARINE POL’Y 102, 105 (2014). 
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While the United States has adequate access to protein resources, many 
other countries, such as Sierra Leone, whose populations depend upon 
fish as a primary protein source, face tremendous challenges with com-
batting IUU fishing.4 As global populations increase, but critical food 
resources decrease, it is evident there is a critical need to “re-tool” the 
food system to eliminate the pressures of IUU fishing. 
Nations have responded to this threat with a number of binding and 
nonbinding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) or within Regional Fisheries Manage-
ment Organizations (RFMOs). The most recent of these agreements is 
the 2009 FAO Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA).5 The legally 
binding PSMA has the objective of preventing, deterring, and eliminat-
ing IUU fishing. This Article argues that the long-term success of PSMA 
will depend on the ability of states to link their port state measures to 
trade-related enforcement, including potential closures of markets and 
requirements for traceability. Without a reasonable ability to sanction 
flag states through trade measures, there will be minimal interruption in 
the current IUU fishing chain. With all of the existing marine challenges 
inherent in responding to warming oceans and acidification, there can be 
little hope of marine fish and shellfish stocks adapting to changing envi-
ronmental conditions if these existing stocks fail to recover due to over-
exploitation.6 
This Article starts with a brief introduction to the complexities of 
ocean governance with its multiple delineations of jurisdiction and its 
multiple actors, including flag states, coastal states, and port states. The 
Article continues with an introduction to the international legal responses 
to IUU fishing that culminated in the negotiation of the PSMA. The third 
Part details the United States’ support of the PSMA and current efforts, 
as of 2015, to implement the PSMA. The final Part highlights trade-
related language from the International Plan of Action on IUU Fishing, 
and recommends that the United States and other states who are creating 
                                                        
 4 . See MARIE-CAROLINE BADJECK ET AL., THE VULNERABILITY OF FISHING-DEPENDENT 
ECONOMIES TO DISASTERS 12 (2013), available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3328e.pdf (listing a 
number of developing states whose nutrition depends on fish); S.A. Freetown, Good Catch, 
ECONOMIST (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2012/10/fishing-sierra-leone 
(observing that it is estimated to cost West Africa up to $1.5 billion a year). 
 5. United Nations Conference of the Food and Agricultural Organization, Rome, Italy, Nov. 
18–23, 2009, Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreport-
ed and Unregulated Fishing, FAO Doc. C 2009/LIM/11-Rev1 (Nov. 22, 2009) [hereinafter PSMA], 
available at http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/2_037t-e.pdf. 
 6. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, STATE OF THE WORLD FISHERIES AND 
AQUACULTURE 37 (2014), available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e/i3720e01.pdf [hereinafter 
FAO, STATE OF THE WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE]. 
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or revising legislation to implement the PSMA consider including trade-
related measures to bolster the objectives of the PSMA. 
II. COMPLEX MULTI-ACTOR OCEAN GOVERNANCE 
States have been historically reluctant to restrict fishing access by 
vessels flagged to their nation because they have generally assumed a 
right to take bountiful and renewable resources from the oceans, espe-
cially on the high seas.7 With the negotiation of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), states agreed to a para-
digm shift in ocean jurisdiction. 8  UNCLOS divides responsibilities 
among flag states, coastal states, and port states.9 Concerned about the 
depletion of ocean resources, particularly living marine stocks, states 
agreed to create exclusive economic zones (EEZ). In these zones, coastal 
states would be empowered to create and enforce conservation and man-
agement measures to protect living marine resources from ongoing de-
pletion.10 Of particular note for this Article about PSMA, states also 
agreed under UNCLOS to empower port states to assert legislative and 
enforcement jurisdiction over incidents involving marine pollution.11 
In spite of this new jurisdictional regime recognizing coastal and 
port states’ authority in particular circumstances, states were generally 
unprepared to depart from known marine legal customs governing indi-
vidual vessels. The flag state retained its primacy as the state asserting 
primary enforcement powers over vessels registered to its flag. For in-
stance, under UNCLOS Article 94, where there are concerns about 
whether “proper jurisdiction and control” has been exercised in relation 
to a ship, the state with concerns may contact the flag state, who must 
investigate the concerns and then “if appropriate, take any action neces-
sary to remedy the situation.”12 Likewise, under UNCLOS Article 217, 
                                                        
 7. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AGREEMENT TO PROMOTE COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURES BY FISHING VESSELS ON THE 
HIGH SEAS (1995), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/MEETING/003/X3130m/X3130E00.HTM. 
 8. United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 31363 [here-
inafter UNCLOS], available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/v183 
3.pdf. 
 9. Id. The term “flag state” refers to the state that registers a vessel and permits the vessel to fly 
the flag of the state; every vessel must be registered to a flag state. In many cases, the owner and 
crew of a vessel will not be nationals of the flag state. The term “coastal state” refers to the state that 
asserts control over fisheries management within the exclusive economic zone, a 200 nautical mile 
zone typically measured from the coast. The term “port state” refers to the state whose ports are 
either used for off-loading and on-loading of cargo or to obtain port services such as refueling. 
 10. See id. at arts. 61, 62, 73. 
 11. See id. at art. 218. 
 12. Id. at art. 94(6). 
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flag states have the responsibility to enforce national and international 
rules, standards, law, and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control ma-
rine pollution “irrespective of where a violation occurs.”13 As part of 
their obligations, flag states are expected to “periodically” inspect vessels 
and to prosecute violators “irrespective of where the violation occurred 
or where the pollution caused by such violation has occurred or has been 
spotted.”14 While there is no similarly structured language for flag states 
to provide oversight of their fishing fleets, the Convention leaves it to 
flag states to punish IUU fishing beyond the assignment of fines.15 
As the global market for fishery products has increased, a growing 
side effect is that there is often little correlation between the owners of 
fishing fleets and the states that flag these fleets.16 Beneficial owners of 
fleets, especially IUU fishing fleets, obtain registration in states that are 
unlikely or unable to enforce conservation and management measures.17 
In some fleets, the beneficial owners who profit from a fleet’s fishing 
activities lack any “genuine link” to the states that provided registra-
tion.18 At best, the links between a vessel and a state may exist in the 
form of a shell company that might also provide a tax haven.19 Originally 
obtained to circumvent labor rules, safety regulations, and tax laws, these 
vessel registrations are generically referred to as “open registries,” “flags 
of convenience,” or “flags of non-compliance” (hereinafter referred to as 
                                                        
 13. Id. at art. 217(1). 
 14. See id. at art. 217(3)–(4). 
 15. See id. at art. 73. Within an exclusive economic zone, a coastal state may impose a penalty 
but may not impose imprisonment unless there is an agreement between the coastal state and flag 
state. Id. A coastal state must inform a flag state of any detention or arrest of any vessels registered 
with the flag state. Id. Agreements exist for the transfer of piracy suspects, but a search of public 
databases containing bilateral ocean agreements provides no agreements between coastal and flag 
states specifically referencing UNCLOS Article 73. See, e.g., R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41455, PIRACY: A LEGAL DEFINITION 6 (2010), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R41455.pdf (describing bilateral agreements by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Europe-
an Union, and others with governments in the Horn of Africa region that define procedures for the 
detention, transfer, and prosecution of captured pirate suspects). 
 16 . See Michael Scott Moore, Lowering Flags of Convenience for Fish Poachers, PAC. 
STANDARD MAG. (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.psmag.com/politics-and-law/lowering-flags-of-
convenience-for-fish-poachers-39127 (describing Spanish practices of flagging in Belize). 
 17. Id. 
 18. ROBIN R. CHURCHILL ET AL., THE MEANING OF THE “GENUINE LINK” REQUIREMENT IN 
RELATION TO THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPS 30 (2000), available at http://orca.cf.ac.uk/45062/1/ITF-
Oct2000.pdf (describing how a Danish owned, Danish crewed vessel’s only link to the flag state of 
Panama was “the administrative formality of registration”) (quoting Case C-286/90, 
Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen and Diva Navigat, 1992 E.C.R. I-6019). 
 19. Serge Beslier, Enforcement and Surveillance: What are Our Technical Capacities and How 
Much Are We Willing to Pay?, in ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., FISH PIRACY 314 (2004), 
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/document/cwp/cwp_23/inf3e.pdf. 
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“flags of convenience”).20 Among the notorious flags of convenience for 
fishing vessels are states deemed to have high levels of corruption, in-
cluding Honduras, Panama, and Belize.21 
Because of the dispersed nature of the global fisheries market, ves-
sels often land fishing cargo in countries besides their flag state.22 In 
practice, this means that the flag state is unlikely to ever inspect the car-
go of vessels on its registry. This is especially true for distant water fish-
ing fleets. China’s distant water tuna fleet is the largest in the world, with 
over 500 vessels, as compared to the U.S. distant water tuna fleet of ap-
proximately 39 vessels.23 Around 70% of the Chinese distant water ves-
sels appear to be privately owned.24 It is unclear where some of the Chi-
nese vessels are landing their catches. For example, of the 3.1 million 
tons of fish that Chinese vessels appear to be harvesting off the coast of 
Western Africa, 2.5 million tons appear to be unreported.25 It is likely 
that some of the catch is ending up in one or more “ports of convenience” 
                                                        
 20. Why So Many Shipowners Find Panama’s Flag Convenient, BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-28558480. 
 21 . MATTHEW GIANNI & WALTER SIMPSON, AUSTL. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FISHERIES AND 
FORESTRY, THE CHANGING NATURE OF HIGH SEAS FISHING 4 (2005), available at 
http://www.wwf.org.uk/filelibrary/pdf/flagsofconvenience.pdf. Transparency International ranked 
171 states on “perceptions of corruption” with more transparent countries having lower ranking 
scores. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2014 (2014), available at 
http://files.transparency.org/content/download/1869/12486/file/CPI2014_map-and-country-
results_EN.pdf. Among the states reviewed in 2014 that are considered significant flags of conven-
ience, Honduras ranked 126, Panama ranked 94, and Belize was not given a ranking. Id. 
 22. Typically, port data is available through commercial data providers. For the public to track 
vessels, there are a number of websites that indicate the last port visits by a specific vessel. See, e.g., 
VESSELFINDER, http://www.vesselfinder.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2015) (proving the ability to see 
which vessels are in a given port based on Automatic Identification System (AIS) data or where they 
are currently operating). On March 17, 2015, the database identified 254 Panamanian-flagged fish-
ing vessels with International Maritime Organization numbers. Vessels Database: AIS Ship Da-
ta/Positions, VESSELFINDER (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.vesselfinder.com/vessels?t=5&f=PA. 
Curiously, only one Panamanian-flagged fishing vessel had a real-time location based on AIS data, 
which appeared to be recorded off the coast of Turkey. Id. A new website, Global Fishing Watch, 
created by Google, Skytruth, and Oceana may soon become available to provide additional public 
access to information about fishing and port activity based on AIS data. See GLOBAL FISHING 
WATCH, http://globalfishingwatch.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
 23. Tabitha Mallory, China’s Distant Water Fishing Industry: Evolving Policies and Implica-
tions, 38 MARINE POL’Y 99, 102, 105 (2013) (listing seiners and tuna vessels for 2008 and indicating 
an intent on the part of China to expand its distant water fishing fleet). See also NAT’L INST. FOR 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, COMMERCIAL FISHING MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 1 (2014), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2014-126/pdfs/2014-126.pdf (reporting 2012 numbers). 
 24. ROLAND BLOMEYER ET AL., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL 
POLICIES, THE ROLE OF CHINA IN WORLD FISHERIES 12 (June 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/pech/dv/chi/china.pdf. 
 25. Id. at 11. 
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where it may be processed and then eventually enter the channels of 
trade.26 
Adding to this complex marine resource governance scheme are 
globalized fish processing services. With the exception of artisanal fish-
eries, the national link between a fishery, a fishing vessel, and the final 
market is increasingly tenuous.27 In addition to the operation of distant 
water industrial fishing vessels that may employ international crews, 
there is a surprising amount of global processing that makes it difficult to 
trace the biological origin of fish in contrast to the trade origin.28 Fish 
cargos that originate in one state are frequently shipped to another state, 
such as China, for processing and then are returned to the first state.29 
Because the fish and seafood processing often involves fileting or de-
shelling, there is great latitude for both accidental and intentional misla-
beling, and the mixing of legally and illegally obtained seafood.30 China 
requires a “Certificate of Origin” to receive fish and shellfish for pro-
cessing in order to assign tariffs, but has not used this certificate as a 
means to combat IUU fishing.31 What becomes clear from this overview 
of ocean governance is that tracking of fish products from ocean to port 
is critical in unraveling the web of IUU fishing. 
III. EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO IUU FISHING 
Given the importance of fish as a primary protein source for a large 
number of people, especially from developing states, the international 
community has made several attempts, with varying degrees of success, 
to address the problem of IUU fishing. These efforts include the 1993 
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (1993 
                                                        
 26. Some of the illegal fish from the Chinese distant water fishing fleets is likely to be entering 
the European Union markets. See generally id. at 55 (outlining imports of Chinese fishing products 
by European Union states). 
 27. Id. at 12. This is reflected in the phenomenon of distant water fishing fleets that deploy to 
non-flag state waters and may ship products to non-flag state ports. 
 28 . The Surprising Source of Your Favorite Seafoods, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
AGENCY, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/aquaculture/homepage_stories/09_13_12_top_seafood_ 
consumed.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015) (observing that the United States in 2011 imported about 
91% of the seafood consumed in the United States, but of the portion caught by American fishermen, 
some portion of these imports were exported overseas for processing and then reimported to the 
United States). 
 29. BLOMEYER ET AL., supra note 24, at 13 (noting that China has 718 processing plants, freez-
er vessels, and factory vessels approved for export to the European Union). 
 30 . SHELLEY CLARKE, TRAFFIC EAST ASIA, UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S FISH TRADE AND 
TRACEABILITY SYSTEM vi (2009). 
 31. Id. at vii. 
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Agreement),32 the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement,33 and the 2001 Interna-
tional Plan of Action on IUU Fishing (IPOA-IUU).34 The most recent 
effort to end IUU fishing is the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA), 
which is the primary subject of this Article. 
Initial global legal efforts to end IUU fishing focused on the coastal 
states by setting necessary fishing conservation and management 
measures within their borders and RFMOs setting similar measures for 
the high seas.35 Coastal states and RFMO members were provided with 
initial fisheries enforcement authority. 36  This approach to combatting 
IUU fishing works for states that can assert a similar degree of political 
power. It has been less successful for politically weak states with little 
bargaining capacity.37 
Because of the large number of developing states that have provid-
ed their flag for registration, states have opted to approach the IUU fish-
ing problem as a capacity building problem. After UNCLOS, states have 
focused most of their legal efforts to combat IUU fishing on (1) strength-
ening flag state control; (2) empowering regional fishery bodies to apply 
their management measures to noncontracting parties; (3) creating net-
works for regional cooperation particularly for monitoring control and 
surveillance; and (4) providing developing states with technical and fi-
nancial assistance.38 While policymakers have acknowledged the signifi-
                                                        
 32. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Agreement to Promote Compliance 
with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, 
Res. 15/93, U.N. FAO Conference, 27th Sess., S. Treaty Doc. 103-24 (1993). 
 33. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention of 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Strad-
dling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement], available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume% 
202167/v2167.pdf. 
 34 . FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., INTERNATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION TO PREVENT, DETER AND 
ELIMINATE ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING (2001) [hereinafter IPOA-IUU], 
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.htm. 
 35. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, at arts. 61, 62, 118. The term “IUU fishing” does not appear in 
UNCLOS; it is first defined in the 2001 IPOA-IUU. 
 36. Under UNCLOS Article 73(1), coastal states may board, inspect, arrest, and undertake 
judicial proceedings against ships in contravention of conservation and management measures. Id. at 
art. 73(1). 
 37 . See, e.g., Senegalese Authorities Release Russian Trawler Detained Over IUU, 
UNDERCURRENT NEWS (Jan. 22, 2014, 9:28 AM), http://www.undercurrentnews.com/2014/01/22/ 
senegalese-authorities-release-russian-trawler-detained-over-iuu/. 
 38. See, e.g., JUDITH SWAN, FISHING VESSELS OPERATING UNDER OPEN REGISTERS AND THE 
EXERCISE OF FLAG STATE RESPONSIBILITIES (2002), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/ 
y3824e/y3824e00.htm; About Us, INT’L MCS NETWORK, http://www.imcsnet.org/about-us/ (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2015); Liberian Fisheries Observer from NOAA Program Helps Liberia Apprehend 
Alleged Illegal Fishing Vessel, NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/stories/2011/09/06_ 
liberian_fishery_observer.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
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cance of ports as the gateways to profitable markets, it has only recently 
been adopted as a primary strategy for ending IUU fishing.39 The follow-
ing paragraphs summarize the normative evolution towards binding port 
state management. 
Historically, port states have rarely inspected foreign-flagged ves-
sels for compliance with fishing and conservation measures even though 
ports are part of a state’s internal waters and there is no debate that states 
can assert maximum enforcement jurisdiction over their internal waters.40 
As illustrated by the recent PSMA agreement, which focused almost ex-
clusively on the role of port states, it is only recently that global attention 
has shifted to relying on port state authority to combat IUU fishing and 
end “port hopping” practices. While port state enforcement has its own 
complexities, it is generally considered less dangerous than at-sea 
boardings.41 As will be discussed below, much of the recent impetus be-
hind bolstering port authority has been led by countries such as members 
of the European Union, who have been less able to effectively control 
their distant water fleets than to control their ports. 
Early negotiations on the topic of port authority were slow to rec-
ognize the value in shifting from a regime where the flag state held pri-
mary authority, to one of parallel flag and port state authority. In 1993, 
parties to the FAO recognized that fishing on the high seas by certain 
vessels was undermining cooperative efforts by RFMOs and adopted an 
agreement to promote international conservation and management 
measures.42 States agreed that when a vessel was voluntarily in the port 
of a party to the 1993 Agreement, the port state must notify the flag state 
if the vessel is suspected of IUU fishing.43 The flag state would then have 
the option of permitting the port state to investigate.44 
In 1995, the Fish Stocks Agreement provided specific recognition 
of the role of port states in combatting IUU fishing practices.45 Article 23 
                                                        
 39. IPOA-IUU, supra note 34, ¶ 52–64. 
 40. G.P. PAMBORIDES, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING LAW: LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT 26 
(1999). 
 41. See, e.g., NZ Navy Barred from Boarding Boats in Fishing Stand-Off, BBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30808949 (illustrating the challenges associated with at 
sea boarding). 
 42 . Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas art. V(2), Nov. 24, 1995, 2221 U.N.T.S. 189, availa-
ble at http://www.fao.org/docrep/MEETING/003/X3130m/X3130E00.HTM. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (providing that “[p]arties may make arrangements regarding the undertaking by port 
states of such investigatory measures as may be considered necessary to establish whether the fish-
ing vessel has indeed been used contrary to the provisions of this Agreement”). 
 45. See 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 33. 
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provided that port states have “the right and the duty to take measures, in 
accordance with international law, to promote the effectiveness 
of . . . conservation and management measures.” 46  The Fish Stocks 
Agreement, however, fell short of actually requiring anything from port 
states. Instead, the agreement simply provided that a port state “may” 
inspect documents, gear, and catch for boats that are voluntarily in port. 
Similarly, states “may” adopt regulations to prohibit landings and trans-
shipments that potentially are IUU fishing products.47 
In spite of the effort to bring greater attention to the authority of the 
port state, both the 1993 Agreement and the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement 
provided too much discretion for the port state, which could decide 
whether or not to invest resources in inspections. The IPOA-IUU, nego-
tiated in connection with the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsi-
ble Fisheries, was an attempt to provide more guidance, standards, and 
norms for states.48 In keeping with previously negotiated instruments, the 
2001 IPOA-IUU retained its focus on the primacy of the flag state by 
providing that the port state could act, but needed the consent of the flag 
state. 49 
While the IPOA-IUU is not binding on states that agree to imple-
ment it, the use of the words “should” and “may,” in contrast to “shall” 
or “must,” only further weakens any urgency to implement the IPOA-
IUU on the part of any FAO member state.50 For example, paragraph 55 
provides that states “should” require fishing vessels seeking port access 
to provide prior notice. This notice includes documentation of fishing 
authorization, as well as information about the fishing voyage and quan-
tities of fish on board.51 States “should not allow” a vessel to land or 
transship upon “clear evidence” that the vessel “has engaged in IUU fish-
ing activity,” but should instead convey information about the activities 
to the vessel’s flag state.52 Finally, the IPOA-IUU provides that if during 
an inspection a port state has “reasonable grounds” to suspect that a ves-
sel is engaged in or supporting IUU fishing, then the port state should 
alert the flag state and “may take other action with the consent of, or up-
on the request of, the flag State.”53 
                                                        
 46. Id. at art. 23(1). 
 47. See id. at arts. 23(2) and 23(3). 
 48. IPOA-IUU, supra note 34. 
 49. See id. ¶¶ 52–64. 
 50. Id. ¶ 4. 
 51. Id. ¶ 55. 
 52. Id. ¶¶ 56, 58. 
 53. Id. ¶ 59. 
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While well-intentioned, states’ efforts under the 1993 Compliance 
Agreement, the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, and the 2001 IPOA-IUU 
that focused largely on flag states, failed to curb IUU fishing. Only re-
cently have states decided to direct focused legal attention on creating 
multilateral uniform, transparent, and nondiscriminatory port state 
measures. The following sections describe efforts by the European Union 
(EU) and FAO member states to give port states primary authority to 
combat IUU fishing. 
A. European Union Measures 
In 2008, the EU adopted the EU-IUU agreement focused on port 
regulation that in many respects reflects a binding version of the IPOA-
IUU. Further, the EU-IUU is a precursor for the PSMA described in the 
following section.54 Specifically, the EU prohibited access to ports within 
the EU unless a third-country fishing vessel could demonstrate compli-
ance with the requirements in the EU-IUU regulation.55 Vessels flying a 
flag of the EU were also prohibited from transshipping out of a third-
country fishing state unless the vessel was registered under a RFMO.56 
The EU-IUU regulation also requires the EU to designate specific ports 
for landings, and mandates that any fishing master from a third-country 
state provide prior notice of their request to enter the port. Further, copies 
of fishing permits and information about the catch, including quantities, 
species, and locations of catch, are required.57 Finally, under the regula-
tion, EU member states are expected to inspect at least 5% of fishing or 
transshipment vessels, but must inspect any vessel listed as an IUU ves-
sel, observed to be an IUU vessel, or presumed to be IUU fishing.58 
The EU-IUU regulation further required that the flag state of a ves-
sel certify that the quantities of fish listed on a catch certificate were 
caught in accordance with established EU laws, EU regulations, and in-
ternational conservation and management measures.59 In addition, the 
catch certificate should be submitted at least three working days prior to 
arriving at port to competent authorities in the EU member state where 
                                                        
 54. See generally Council Regulation 1005/2008, of 29 September 2008 Establishing a Com-
munity System to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 2008 
O.J. (L 286) (EC) [hereinafter EU-IUU Fishing Regulation]. 
 55. Id. at art. 4(2). 
 56. Id. at art. 4(4). 
 57. Id. at art. 5, 6. 
 58. Id. at art. 9 (citing Article 25, which references a number of sources of evidence upon 
which the EU can make a finding of presumed IUU fishing that must be reported to the vessel and 
the flag state of the vessel under Article 26). 
 59. Id. at art. 12(3). 
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the catch will be imported.60 When a catch has been processed immedi-
ately before arriving in the EU, a processing plant certificate that con-
nects the fish to a catch certificate must accompany the catch.61 The EU 
may choose to list a noncooperating country, which will have the option 
to either cooperate with conservation and management measures or lose 
market access.62 Because the EU is a large market for fish products, the 
success of its EU-IUU Regulation will depend on its ability to both dis-
cipline flags of convenience and close down ports of convenience. 
The EU-IUU regulation reflects a significant evolution in state ef-
fort to combat IUU fishing because: (1) it requires affirmative verifica-
tion from a flag state of catch certificates before access to ports are per-
mitted, and (2) it has regulatory teeth in the form of trade sanctions. 
While the EU-IUU regulation must be applauded, in particular, for using 
restrictions on trade as a strong deterrent to IUU fishing, it is not enough 
for the EU by itself to close its borders to IUU fishing. As explained ear-
lier, the ports of convenience provide too much potential trade leakage, 
as IUU fishing operations seek to launder their illegal fish through ports 
of convenience and back into the EU’s markets. 
B. Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) 
The international community has provided an additional framework 
for tackling ports of convenience with the introduction of the binding 
Port States Measures Agreement.63 Negotiated by FAO members, the 
PSMA requires parties to deny port access to an IUU vessel and imple-
ment port measures to inspect foreign vessels to determine whether the 
foreign vessel may be an IUU vessel. 
The concept of a port state imposing port measures on foreign ves-
sels is not new. Since the early 1980s, states have negotiated memoranda 
of understanding (MOU) that require a certain percentage of all foreign 
vessels to be inspected, typically for safety and pollution standards.64 
                                                        
 60. Id. at art. 16(1). 
 61. Id. at art. 14. 
 62. Id. at Chapter VI. The EU has closed its markets to parties who are in violation of the EU-
IUU regulations, including prohibiting all fishery products from Cambodia and Guinea. See Ques-
tions and Answers on the EU’s Fight Against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, 
EUR. COMMISSION (Dec. 12, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/mare/ 
itemdetail.cfm?item_id=19549. 
 63. See PSMA, supra note 5. 
 64. Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in Implementing Agreements on 
Maritime Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment, Jan. 26, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter 
Paris MOU]; Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region, Dec. 
1, 1993, available at http://www.tokyo-mou.org/doc/memorand.pdf [hereinafter Tokyo MOU]. 
Additional regional MOUs include the Viña del Mar & Caribbean MOU, the Mediterranean MOU, 
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Port states agreed to these MOUs as a means of leveling the regulatory 
playing field in order to increase operational safety, particularly with re-
gards to the commercial shipping fleet.65 The safety and pollution pre-
vention standards provided in these MOUs are now considered the basis 
for international standards.66 
The FAO understood the value of previous MOUs in improving re-
gion-wide port safety standards and, in 2004, proposed a Model Scheme 
on Port State Measures to Combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
Fishing.67 This scheme served as a draft for the PSMA that was conclud-
ed in 2009.68 Ultimately, the PSMA, when fully implemented, is intend-
ed to operate as a harmonization tool like the former MOUs directed at 
safety and pollution prevention standards.69 
As a treaty concluded between sovereign nations, the PSMA leaves 
a great deal to the discretion of each party out of respect for state sover-
eignty.70 Even though the PSMA affords states a wide degree of discre-
tion, the PSMA reflects a critical normative shift in combatting IUU fish-
ing, not just because of its binding nature, but also because it is one of 
the first legal agreements not to give substantial deference to the flag 
state. Even though the text recognizes the “primary responsibility of flag 
[s]tates,” it also implicitly recognizes that flag states, and particularly 
flags of convenience, are part of the problem.71 As a result, the PSMA 
requires that flag states that are parties ensure their vessels cooperate 
with port state inspections, and that the flag state will “immediately and 
fully investigate” any alleged IUU fishing and “upon sufficient evidence, 
take enforcement action without delay.”72 In addition, flag states must 
                                                                                                                            
the Indian MOU, and the Abuja MOU. See UK P&I CLUB LP BULLETIN, PARIS/TOKYO MOU (July 
29, 2011), available at http://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-pi/Photos/LP_Bulletin_ 
Photos/Bulletin%20776.pdf. 
 65. These MOUs are binding on some states. The Paris MOU is binding on EU member states. 
2 INT’L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE, LEGAL MECHANISMS TO ADDRESS MARITIME 
IMPACTS ON MEDITERRANEAN BIODIVERSITY 32 (Nilufer Oral & Francois Simard eds., 2008). 
 66. UK P&I CLUB LP BULLETIN, supra note 64 (describing how practices associated with load 
lines in the Paris and Tokyo MOUs will become the basis for a concentrated inspection campaign). 
 67. See generally FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, MODEL SCHEME ON PORT 
STATE MEASURES TO COMBAT ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0985t/a0985t00.pdf. 
 68. PSMA, supra note 5. 
 69. Paris MOU, supra note 64; Tokyo MOU, supra note 64. 
 70. The current parties as of August 2014 to the PSMA are Chile, the European Union, Gabon, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and Uruguay. 
AGREEMENT ON PORT STATE MEASURES TO PREVENT, DETER AND ELIMINATE ILLEGAL, 
UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING, available at http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ 
legal/docs/6_037s-e.pdf (last updated Aug. 22, 2014). 
 71. PSMA, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 72. Id. at art. 20(4). 
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report to other parties regarding what actions they have taken to support 
the PSMA.73 
The core of the ten-part PSMA is found in Parts 1 through 4. Part 1, 
the definition section of the PSMA, makes it clear that IUU fishing in-
cludes a broad array of activities that cover both actual IUU fishing as 
well as supporting activities, such as transshipping and processing.74 
State parties to the agreement are expected to apply the PSMA to all ves-
sels, which “means any vessel, ship of another type or boat used for, 
equipped for, or intended to be used for, fishing or fishing related activi-
ties.”75 This extends the application of IUU fishing port state measures 
beyond traditional fishing vessels to transshipment vessels, processing 
vessels, and any other relevant transport vessels. Artisanal vessels and 
container vessels where fish have already been landed are exempt from 
the reach of the PSMA.76 
In Part 2 of the PSMA, minimal standards are set for reviewing the 
entry of a vessel into port.77 Every state must designate and publicize at 
which ports vessels may request entry.78 States are expected to require 
certain information before giving entry to a vessel, including name of the 
flag state, physical information about the vessel, the vessel owner’s name, 
the vessel master’s name and nationality, identification details about the 
vessel, relevant fishing authorization (including fishing areas), trans-
shipment authorizations, total catch on board, and the catch to be of-
floaded.79 Parties then have the option to either authorize or deny the en-
try of a vessel.80 
A PSMA party must deny entry to its ports for landing, transship-
ping, packaging, processing, refueling and resupplying, maintenance, and 
                                                        
 73. Id. at art. 20(5). Under this article, it is possible that a state will simply deregister a vehicle 
so that it would no longer be in the position of a flag state. Under the PSMA, it is not clear what 
specific continuing obligations if any it would have after deregistration beyond a shared responsibil-
ity with other parties to the PSMA under Article 23 to take “fair, non-discriminatory, and transparent 
measures consistent” with the PSMA. Id. at art. 23. 
 74. Id. at art. 1(c)–(e). The definition in Article 1(e) of the PSMA for IUU fishing incorporates 
by reference § 3 of 2001 IPOA-IUU, which uses the terms “activities” and “fishing activities.” Nei-
ther of these terms are defined in the 2001 IPOA-IUU. The 2009 PSMA defines “fishing” in Article 
1(c) and “fishing related activities” in Article 1(d), which when read together encompass the object 
of the PSMA. 
 75. Id. at art. 3 (referencing the definition of vessel in Article 1(j)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at arts. 7–10. 
 78. Id. at art. 7. 
 79. Id. at art. 8 (referring to Annex A). It is interesting that the nationality of the vessel owner 
is not required. Identifying beneficial ownership of fishing vessels, and particularly IUU vessels, is a 
recurring problem. 
 80. Id. at art. 9. 
1250 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:1237 
dry docking if it has “sufficient proof” that the vessel “has engaged in 
IUU fishing.”81 This would be the case, for example, if the vessel is on a 
RFMO IUU fishing vessel list.82 If a party denies entry, it must com-
municate that decision not just to the vessel, but also to the vessel’s flag 
state, and “as appropriate and to the extent possible” to “relevant coastal 
States, regional fisheries management organizations[,] and other interna-
tional organizations.”83 
For a party that worries about a suspect vessel fleeing, a party “may 
allow entry . . . exclusively for the purpose of inspecting” the vessel and 
then may take actions that are “at least as effective as denial of port entry 
in preventing, deterring[,] and eliminating IUU fishing and fishing relat-
ed activities.”84 The Background Guide to the PSMA indicates that these 
actions might “include taking market-related measures or, as appropriate, 
initiating legal proceedings under national law.”85 
In Part 3, parties that have permitted a vessel into port must deny 
the use of the port if: (1) the vessel lacks an authorization for fishing or 
fishing-related activities required either by the port state or a coastal 
state; (2) there is “clear evidence” that the fish on board were taken in 
violation of coastal state requirements; (3) the flag state did not provide 
confirmation “within a reasonable period of time” that the fish on board 
were taken in conformity with RFMO rules; or (4) if a party has “reason-
able grounds” to believe that a vessel was engaged in IUU fishing.86 
Finally in Part 4, because no minimum number of inspections are 
required under the PSMA, parties must establish an appropriate level of 
inspection.87 States do not have much guidance under the PSMA, alt-
hough they might look to the implementation of existing port MOUs for 
help. For example, under the Tokyo MOU, states have agreed to inspect 
80% of the merchant vessels operating in an area for safety violations.88 
                                                        
 81. Id. at art. 9(4), 9(6). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at art. 9(3). 
 84. Id. at art. 9(4). 
 85 . DAVID J. DOULMAN & JUDITH SWAN, A GUIDE TO THE BACKGROUND AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2009 FAO AGREEMENT ON PORT STATE MEASURES TO PREVENT DETER 
AND ELIMINATE ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING 45 (2012) [hereinafter 
BACKGROUND GUIDE], available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2590e/i2590e00.pdf. 
 86. PSMA, supra note 5, at art. 11(1). A vessel suspected under “reasonable grounds” of IUU 
fishing may assume the burden of proof to demonstrate “that it was acting in a manner consistent 
with relevant conservation and management measures[,]” or in the case of a provisioning boat being 
suspected of IUU fishing activities that the vessel receiving supplies and crew from the provisioning 
boat was not an IUU vessel. Id. 
 87. Id. at art. 12. 
 88. BACKGROUND GUIDE, supra note 85, at 50. 
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Annex B of the PSMA does provide standards for IUU fishing in-
spections, such that inspectors must follow protocols that will avoid “un-
duly delaying the vessel” and avoid “action that would adversely affect 
the quality of the fish on board.”89 Inspectors, “in case of appropriate 
arrangements with the flag State,” shall invite the flag state to partici-
pate. 90  Parties must provide a written report for each inspection that 
would be sent to the flag state and, “as appropriate,” the state of national-
ity for the vessel master, RFMOs, the FAO, any states that may have 
been affected by IUU fishing, and any other relevant international organ-
ization.91 Where an inspection yields evidence of IUU fishing, the vessel 
must be denied port access for all uses unrelated to the safety or health of 
the crew or vessel.92 If the party has unlawfully conducted the inspection 
and there is recourse available in the party’s law, then the party must in-
form the public.93 
Parties operating “within the framework of the FAO” are expected 
to provide for “regular and systematic monitoring and review of the im-
plementation of the PSMA,” including holding a meeting of the parties 
four years after the PSMA enters into force.94 Dispute resolution is avail-
able under the treaty with final referrals based on “the consent of all par-
ties to the dispute” being referred to the International Court of Justice, 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), or arbitration.95 A 
failure to reach consensus results in the parties returning to a status quo 
of consultation and cooperation.96 
Whether the PSMA will be a successful treaty in combatting IUU 
fishing remains a function of the level of participation that the agreement 
attracts by port states. Parties are encouraged to solicit membership in the 
treaty by nonparties, but there does not seem to be either an incentive or 
disincentive scheme for not joining.97 If the PSMA becomes as widely 
adopted as the various MOUs on safety and pollution, it will be an effec-
tive legal tool for creating a network of port states that are proactively 
                                                        
 89. PSMA, supra note 5, at art. 13(f). 
 90. Id. at art. 13(e). No further explanation has been given in FAO documentation regarding 
what constitutes “appropriate arrangements.” 
 91. Id. at art. 15. 
 92. Id. at art. 18. 
 93. Id. at art. 19. There is no automatic right to appeal the inspection results. 
 94. Id. at art. 24. PSMA Article 29 provides that the party will enter into force thirty days after 
the deposit of the 25th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Id. at art. 29. 
 95. Id. at art. 22(3). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at art. 23; cf. The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
art. 4, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.1550 (describing control of trade with nonparties including trade 
bans on certain ozone depleting substances). 
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denying access to known IUU fishing vessels and inspecting vessels sus-
pected of IUU fishing. The PSMA marks a notable improvement over 
former negotiated instruments designed to assist in combatting IUU fish-
ing because it binds parties. Now, when parties fail to make a good faith 
effort to intervene in the case of a suspected IUU vessel, other states may 
have recourse at least to dispute resolution. The next Part describes the 
imminent adoption of the obligations of the PSMA in the United States. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PORT STATE MEASURES AGREEMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
The United States already has existing legislation and regulations to 
combat IUU fishing. The Magnuson–Stevens Act on fisheries provides 
that the United States must support regional fisheries management organ-
ization efforts to end IUU fishing, including import prohibitions and im-
port restrictions based on multilateral findings.98  The Nicholson Act, 
found in the shipping code, prevents foreign-flagged fishing vessels and 
refrigerated cargo ships from landing their high seas catches in most 
ports under U.S. jurisdiction.99 This legislation, however, has not been 
applied to fish cargos that are originating from the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) of the United States.100 
What happens in practice is that fish cargo from both U.S. vessels 
and foreign-flagged vessels is often transshipped without any inspection 
from the National Marine Fisheries Service.101 Some fish that may have 
been illegally harvested will end up laundered into the market with legal-
ly harvested fish. Regulations from the 1990s addressed this loophole by 
making it illegal for any foreign-flagged vessels to “ship, transport, offer 
for sale, sell, purchase, import, export, or have custody, control, or pos-
session of any fish taken or retained in violation of the Magnuson–
Stevens Act.”102 As the large number of suspected illegal fish entering 
into U.S. markets suggests, enforcement has been challenging. Existing 
                                                        
 98 . Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1826(i) 
(2014). 
 99. Unloading Fish from Foreign Vessels, 46 U.S.C. § 55114 (2014). American Samoa, Guam, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands are exempt from this requirement. See Testimony of James Walsh, Before 
the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, Ocean, & Insular Affairs of the H. Comm. on Natural Res., 
113th Cong. (2014), available at http://www.dwt.com/files/Publication/26a7ce7e-ed94-4fb9-a1d8-
ed69d3083312/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e9687a78-ba83-4ebb-b80f-ed6ceba193be/IUU% 
20Testimony.pdf. 
 100. ORG. OF ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., WHY FISH PIRACY PERSISTS 272 (2005). 
 101. Id. 
 102. 50 C.F.R. § 600.505 (2014). 
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laws have largely confined market prohibitions and restrictions to in-
stances where there are “multilateral related market measures.”103 
The United States has demonstrated a clear intent to become a party 
to the PSMA. Participation by major consumer states whose ports re-
ceive large cargos of fish is critical to the long-term success of the 
PSMA. As of 2015, only nine states and the European Union are mem-
bers, with pending ratification from the United States.104 The low ratifi-
cation numbers are less problematic than the notable consumer states that 
have not yet joined the treaty. The top importers of seafood in the world 
in terms of value are Japan, the United States, and China.105 There has 
been no indication on official webpages that Japan or China intend to 
join the PSMA in the near future.106 
On April 3, 2014, the United States Senate, in an executive session, 
gave advice and consent to U.S. ratification of the PSMA.107 As part of 
the advice and consent, the Senate also declared that the PSMA would 
not be self-executing, which means that implementing legislation is re-
quired for the treaty obligations to bind the United States.108 As of this 
Article’s publication date, Congress has not yet passed implementing 
legislation, though it is presumed that it will do so shortly whereupon the 
President is highly likely to approve the implementing legislation and 
submit a ratification instrument on behalf of the United States. The Pres-
ident has publicly declared that in 2015, the Executive Branch will seek 
to ensure that the PSMA goes into force with the required twenty-five 
signatories to regulate all fish landings from foreign-flagged transport 
and supply vessels. This addition has the potential to increase the re-
                                                        
 103. 16 U.S.C. § 1826(i) (1996). 
 104. AGREEMENT ON PORT STATE MEASURES TO PREVENT, DETER AND ELIMINATE ILLEGAL, 
UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING, supra note 70 (stating that twenty-seven states have 
signed the PSMA). 
 105. FAO, STATE OF THE WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE, supra note 6, at 50. It is 
worth noting that even though China imports large amounts of fish, the statistics do not capture fish 
that is imported and then reexported. The largest market for fishery products is the European Union. 
It is not counted as a state in the FAO statistics. Id. 
 106. The author searched for the term “port state measures agreement” at the English version 
of the Japanese Fisheries Agency at http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/e/, the English version of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs at http://www.mofa.go.jp/, and the English version of the Chinese Foreign Minis-
try at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/. 
 107. Thursday April 3, 2014, U.S. SENATE DAILY PRESS (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.dailypress 
.senate.gov/?p=891. There appears to have been little controversy since the Senate gave its advice 
and consent to four treaties in twenty minutes. The advice and consent was given by a division vote 
where the presiding officer requests the senators to stand for those voting yes and those voting no in 
order to confirm the voice vote. 
 108. Id. 
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sources that the United States dedicates to ending illegal trade in IUU 
fishing products.109 
The various legislative bills proposed by Congress have addressed 
the significant extension to transport vessels. Three of the bills, the 2014 
Pirate Fishing Elimination Act, as well as the House and Senate versions 
of the IUU Fishing Enforcement Act of 2015, are briefly discussed here. 
A. 2014 Pirate Fishing Elimination Act 
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
supported the Pirate Fishing Elimination Act on January 8, 2014. The 
Act is designed “to make the changes to domestic law necessary for the 
United States to implement” the PSMA and to cover both foreign vessels 
seeking entry to ports under U.S. jurisdiction, as well as U.S. vessels 
seeking entry to ports subject to the jurisdiction of a party to the 
PSMA.110 
In keeping with the basic design of the PSMA, the Pirate Fishing 
Elimination Act would have empowered the Secretary of Commerce to 
deny entry to a known IUU vessel or a vessel suspected to be engaged in 
IUU fishing activities.111 Port state services would be denied if a vessel 
enters without prior authorization, is a listed IUU vessel, or is suspected 
to be “in violation of foreign law or any conservation and management 
measures.”112  Criminal prosecution, civil penalties, and administrative 
fines would serve as the enforcement mechanism for the Pirate Fishing 
Elimination Act.113 While this bill did not make it to the floor for a vote, 
the substance of the bill reappears in the latest version of implementing 
legislation described below. 
B. IUU Fishing Enforcement Act of 2015 
The U.S. House of Representatives and Senate are both currently 
considering bills named the IUU Fishing Enforcement Act of 2015, 
which provides for implementation of the PSMA as well as amendments 
to eleven existing U.S. fishery management statutes to broaden enforce-
ment powers and the implementation of the Convention for the Strength-
                                                        
 109. PSMA, supra note 5, at art. 29; U.S. to Push Ratification of Pact to Fight Illegal Fishing, 
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/news/ 
2015/03/16/us-to-push-ratification-of-pact-to-fight-illegal-fishing. 
 110. Pirate Fishing Elimination Act, S. 267, 113th Cong. (2014); S. REP. NO. 113-132, § 4 
(2014). A former version of the Pirate Fishing Elimination Act was introduced in the 112th Congress 
as S. 1980, 112th Cong. (2012). See also S. REP. NO. 112-255 (2012). 
 111. S. REP. NO. 113-132, § 5 (2014). 
 112. Id. § 7. 
 113. Id. § 10. 
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ening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Established by 
the 1949 Convention Between the United States of America and the Re-
public of Costa Rica, signed at Washington, November 14, 2003.114 Ex-
cept for the order of definitions, the substantive language is identical in 
both bills. Under both bills, a “vessel” subject to the PSMA is defined 
broadly to include “any vessel, ship of another type, or boat used for, 
equipped to be used for, or intended to be used for, fishing or fishing-
related activities, including container vessels that are carrying fish that 
have not been previously landed.” The Secretary of Commerce has the 
power to authorize or deny port entry depending on whether a vessel is 
on a RFMO IUU list or there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the 
vessel “engaged in IUU fishing or fishing-related activities in support of 
such fishing.”115 Both versions of the IUU Fishing Enforcement Act also 
provide for civil and criminal enforcement.116 
The IUU Fishing Enforcement Act of 2015 will likely become the 
implementation legislation for the PSMA. While this legislation will 
provide a clear structure for how to implement port state measures par-
ticularly aimed at regulating foreign-flagged cargo ships, it may not ad-
dress one of the chronic issues with combatting IUU fishing. As long as 
there is a market for IUU fish products, there will continue to be IUU 
fishing activity. For the proposed legislation to be optimally effective at 
addressing the underlying IUU fishing issues, this Article suggests that 
addition of language specific to trade measures should be included in 
whatever version of implementing legislation is ultimately adopted. Part 
V of this Article explores the role that trade measures might play in en-
hancing the effectiveness of existing port state measures. 
                                                        
 114. IUU Fishing Enforcement Act, H.R. 774, 114th Cong. (2015) [hereinafter House IUU 
Fishing Enforcement Act]. IUU Fishing Enforcement Act, S.1334, 114th Cong. (2015) [hereinafter 
Senate IUU Fishing Enforcement Act]. The bills include amendments providing additional enforce-
ment mechanisms under the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act, the High Seas 
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, the North Pacific Anadromous Stocks Act of 1992, the Pacific 
Salmon Treaty Act of 1985, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention Implementation 
Act, the South Pacific Tuna Act of 1988, the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention Act, 
the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act, the High Seas Fishing Compliance Act of 1965, the Dolphin 
Protection Consumer Information Act, the Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1982, the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries Convention Act of 1995, and the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act. 
 115. House IUU Fishing Enforcement Act, supra note 114, §§ 303(8), 305(b); Senate IUU 
Fishing Enforcement Act, supra note 114, §§ 303(10), 305(b). 
 116. House IUU Fishing Enforcement Act, supra note 114, § 308; Senate IUU Fishing En-
forcement Act, supra note 114, § 308. 
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V. ENHANCING PORT STATE MEASURES THROUGH INCORPORATING 
TRADE-RELATED MEASURES INTO IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION 
It is curious that the PSMA makes only two allusions to trade, and 
neither of these references are in the primary text. The first reference, in 
Annex B, requires inspectors to look at all relevant documentation 
onboard a vessel, including trade documents required by the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species.117 The second reference, 
in Annex C, provides a form that requests information regarding whether 
a catch complies with the trade information scheme.118 The PSMA makes 
one allusion to the market in its preamble, which distinguishes between 
port state measures, coastal state measures, and market-related measures. 
As will be suggested below, port state measures and market-related 
measures need not be differentiated since effective port state measures 
rely upon the credible threat of market measures. 
This Part suggests that if the PSMA is to be effective, it should be 
reimagined by its parties as a trade-related agreement and not simply an 
enforcement agreement. The first section reviews the significance of 
trade in marine fish for the global economy and suggests that trade is a 
significant driver for changing behavior. The Part then looks at the inter-
national support of market measures and specifically the United States’ 
support of market measures as part of its efforts to combat IUU fishing 
activity. Finally, the Part proposes that implementation legislation for 
parties to the PSMA specifically allow for unilateral import prohibitions. 
This Part argues that in spite of the disfavor with which the international 
community has regarded unilateral trade prohibitions, a carefully target-
ed ban by one or more states would be WTO compliant. 
A. Significance of Global Fisheries Trade and Trade Measures as  
Drivers for Changing Behavior 
Including trade-related measures in IUU prevention efforts would 
increase their effectiveness because trade in fisheries products is signifi-
cant. In 2012, 200 countries reported exporting fish or fish products.119 
Fish products account for 10% of total agricultural exports and provide 
about 1% of the value of all world merchandise ($102 billion).120 The 
percentage of fish products that are exported worldwide reached a new 
                                                        
 117. PSMA, supra note 5, at Annex B(d). 
 118. Id. at Annex C(34). 
 119. FAO, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE, supra note 6, at 46. 
 120. Id. at 47. 
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record value in 2013 of $136 billion.121 Asian states in particular are fuel-
ing some of the recent increases in fishery export numbers.122 
Market states are increasingly dependent on global trade. For ex-
ample, 100% of the pollock that enters the European market is imported, 
50% of which is imported from China.123 In the United States, 71% of 
cod imports, 96% of pollock imports, and 16% of salmon imports come 
from China.124 Imports of fish products into Europe, the United States, 
and Canada today exceed exports.125 Reflecting further global links in the 
fish products trade is the fact that much of the pollock that is listed as an 
import of China and finds its way onto European and U.S. dinner plates 
originates in Russia.126 
Given the significance of international trade for a state’s economy, 
trade measures can provide a strong driver to influence state behavior. 
For example, when the moratorium on commercial whaling went into 
effect under the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling, 
Japan rejected the moratorium.127 However, because of threatened trade 
restrictions by the United States, Japan eventually restricted its own right 
to commercially whale by entering into an executive agreement with the 
United States to end commercial whaling by 1988.128 The threat of mar-
ket closures by the EU has encouraged states in the context of fishing to 
make substantial changes in the management of their registered ves-
sels.129 
B. International Efforts to Promote Trade Measures to Combat IUU 
Fishing 
The international community has understood the potential effec-
tiveness of trade measures in improving IUU prevention efforts. In the 
                                                        
 121. Id. 
 122. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FAO YEARBOOK: FISHERY AND 
AQUACULTURE STATISTICS 2012, at 45–46 (2014) [hereinafter FAO YEARBOOK], available at 
http://www.fao.org/3/478cfa2b-90f0-4902-a836-94a5dddd6730/i3740t.pdf. 
 123. SHELLEY CLARKE & GILLES HOSCH, TRACEABILITY, LEGAL PROVENANCE & THE EU 
IUU REGULATION 6 (2013), available at http://sasama.info/en/pdf/reports_17.pdf. 
 124. Id. at 7. 
 125. See FAO YEARBOOK, supra note 122, at 51–54. 
 126. CLARKE & HOSCH, supra note 123, at 7. 
 127. Susan Geha, International Regulation of Whaling: The United States’ Compromise, 27 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 931, 933 (1987). 
 128. Id. 
 129. For example, because of the threat by the EU of a closed market, Korea adopted the Dis-
tant Waters Fisheries Development Act to control Korea’s fleets. Bold Action Taken by Korea to 
Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Shows EU IUU Regulation is Working, 
ENVTL. JUST. FOUND. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.ejfoundation.org/news/bold-action-taken-korea-
combat-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-iuu-fishing-shows-eu-iuu. 
1258 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:1237 
nonbinding standards set under the IPOA-IUU, FAO states acknowl-
edged the critical link between trade and ending IUU fishing, but sug-
gested that the measures “should only be used in exceptional circum-
stances, where other measures have proven unsuccessful to prevent, de-
ter[,] and eliminate IUU fishing, and only after prior consultation with 
interested States.” 130  States “should cooperate” to “adopt appropriate 
multilaterally agreed trade-related measures, consistent with the WTO, 
that may be necessary to prevent, deter[,] and eliminate IUU fishing for 
specific fish stocks or species.”131 
Among the trade-related measures proposed for potential multilat-
eral implementation under the IPOA-IUU were “catch documentation 
and certification requirements” and “import and export controls or prohi-
bitions.”132 In particular, states were expected to improve traceability of 
products and work “towards using the Harmonized Commodity Descrip-
tion and Coding System for fish and fisheries products in order to help 
promote the implementation of the IPOA.”133 Many of these concepts 
have not yet been fully realized across global fisheries. 
When the PSMA was being negotiated, the concept of trade was 
contemplated as a subject for cooperation, but the reference to “trade” 
was dropped from the text after a 2006 Expert Consultation.134 This re-
flects a lost opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of the PSMA since 
most of the exported fish will enter into trade through a port. The FAO, 
in its background guide to the PSMA, recognized this gap when it com-
mented that “market-related measures taken in accordance with interna-
tional law are particularly effective.”135 Yet, as the guide then noted, giv-
en the PSMA’s negotiation history, the PSMA “was not intended as a 
trade instrument.”136 In spite of this language, the FAO background guide 
goes on to recommend that among the prohibited acts that states should 
incorporate into their domestic legislation are the PSMA prohibitions on 
“trade in fish or fish products taken, possessed, etc. in violation of any 
treaty or binding conservation measure adopted by an RFMO.”137 This 
language by experts on PSMA implementation recognizes that address-
                                                        
 130. IPOA-IUU, supra note 34, ¶ 66. 
 131. Id. ¶ 68 (referring approvingly to the efforts by ICCAT and other RFMOs to impose trade 
moratoria). 
 132. Id. ¶ 69. 
 133. Id. ¶¶ 71, 75. 
 134. BACKGROUND GUIDE, supra note 85, at 125. 
 135. Id. at 68. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 159 (providing a legal checklist). 
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ing trade linkages is an integral part of ending IUU fishing since IUU 
fishing is fueled by the potential profits of international trade. 
Independent of the FAO’s work on the IPOA-IUU and the PSMA, 
RFMOs have been employing a variety of trade mechanisms to control 
IUU fishing. For example, the Commission for the Conservation of Ant-
arctic Marine Living Resources has required catch and trade documenta-
tion schemes to create pressure to reduce illegally caught Patagonian 
toothfish.138 In 1996, the International Commission on the Conservation 
of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) recommended that its parties prohibit the im-
portation of bluefin tuna from Belize, Honduras, and Panama, which 
were nonparties at the time.139 Similar recommendations were made for 
swordfish landed from vessels registered to Belize, Honduras, and Equa-
torial Guinea.140 Through the 2000s, the ICCAT recommended prohibit-
ing the importation of various products from vessels flagged to Belize, 
Honduras, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines.141 
                                                        
 138. CATHY ROHEIM & JON G. SUTINEN, TRADE AND MARKETPLACE MEASURES TO PROMOTE 
SUSTAINABLE FISHING PRACTICES 5 (2006), available at http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/ 
roheim_sutinen_20061.pdf. 
 139. Int’l Comm’n for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna [ICCAT], Recommendation by 
ICCAT Regarding Belize and Honduras Pursuant to the 1994 Bluefin Tuna Action Plan Resolution, 
ICCAT Recommendation 96-11 (Aug. 4, 1997), available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents%5C 
Recs%5Ccompendiopdf-e%5C1996-11-e.pdf; Int’l Comm’n for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna 
[ICCAT], Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Panama Pursuant to the 1994 ICCAT Bluefin 
Tuna Action Plan Resolution, ICCAT Recommendation 96-12 (Aug. 4, 1997), available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents%5CRecs%5Ccompendiopdf-e%5C1996-12-e.pdf. 
 140. Int’l Comm’n for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna [ICCAT], Recommendation by 
ICCAT Regarding Equatorial Guinea Pursuant to the 1996 “Recommendation Regarding Compli-
ance in the Bluefin Tuna and North Atlantic Swordfish Fisheries”, ICCAT Recommendation 99-10 
(June 15, 2000), available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents%5CRecs%5Ccompendiopdf-
e%5C1999-10-e.pdf; Int’l Comm’n for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna [ICCAT], Recommenda-
tion by ICCAT Regarding Belize and Honduras Pursuant to the 1995 Swordfish Action Plan, ICCAT 
Recommendation 99-08 (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents%5CRecs% 
5Ccompendiopdf-e%5C1999-08-e.pdf. 
 141. See, e.g., Int’l Comm’n for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna [ICCAT], Recommendation 
by ICCAT Regarding Belize, Cambodia, Honduras, St. Vincent and the Grenadines Pursuant to the 
1998 IUU Resolution, ICCAT Recommendation 00-15 (Oct. 15, 2001), available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents%5CRecs%5Ccompendiopdf-e%5C2000-15-e.pdf; Int’l Comm’n for 
the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna [ICCAT], Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Equatorial 
Guinea Pursuant to the 1998 IUU Resolution, ICCAT Recommendation 00-16 (June 26, 2001), 
available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents%5CRecs%5Ccompendiopdf-e%5C2000-16-e.pdf; Int’l 
Comm’n for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna [ICCAT], Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning 
the Importation of Bigeye Tuna and Bigeye Tuna Products from St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
ICCAT Recommendation 01-14 (Sept. 21, 2002), available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents% 
5CRecs%5Ccompendiopdf-e%5C2001-14-e.pdf; Int’l Comm’n for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tuna [ICCAT], Recommendation by ICCAT for Trade Restrictive Measures on Sierra Leone, 
ICCAT Recommendation 02-19 (2002), available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents%5CRecs%5 
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Supranational entities, including the European Union, have re-
sponded to continued increasing trends in IUU fishing by passing trade 
legislation that prohibits trade in specific species from specific states 
suspected of condoning IUU fishing.142 With the exception of the Euro-
pean Union’s efforts, which may be considered multilateral because fish-
eries policy within the EU resides in the European Commission, all of 
the RFMOs efforts have been multilateral.143 Multilateral efforts that lim-
it trade as a means to achieving shared environmental objectives such as 
the Montreal Protocol and CITES have not been deemed to be trade-
restrictive.144 Likewise, any multilateral effort to limit trade-related to the 
PSMA by RFMOs will not be deemed trade-restrictive. 
Yet PSMA members need not wait for RFMO action before taking 
trade-related actions to meet the objectives of the PSMA to prevent, deter, 
and eliminate IUU fishing. Even though the PSMA does not explicitly 
contemplate the use of trade-related mechanisms in its text, is it possible 
for PSMA members, operating within the multilateral context of the 
PSMA, to invoke unilateral trade-restrictive mechanisms in order to 
achieve the objectives of the PSMA. State parties must have the flexibil-
ity not just to restrict access to ports, which may increase traffic into 
ports of convenience, but also to eliminate trade opportunities with states 
that host ports of convenience. The following section suggests that uni-
lateral, WTO-compliant trade measures can be applied through PSMA 
implementing legislation to bolster the effectiveness of the PSMA. 
C. Incorporating Unilateral Trade Measures into Port State Measures 
Implementation Legislation 
While states such as the United States have agreed to support multi-
lateral trade-restrictive efforts adopted through the RFMOs, this ap-
proach has limited the ability of the United States and other concerned 
                                                                                                                            
Ccompendiopdf-e%5C2002-19-e.pdf. 
 142 . See, e.g., Council Regulation 827/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 127) 21; Council Regulation 
828/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 127) 23; and Council Regulation 829/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 127) 25. 
 143. The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/ 
cfp/index_en.htm (last visited May 2, 2015). 
 144. Eric Neumayer, Trade Measures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
and WTO Rules: Potential for Conflict, Scope for Reconciliation, 55(3) AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 1, 15 
(2000), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/geographyAndEnvironment/whosWho/profiles/neumayer/ 
pdf/Article%20in%20Aussenwirtschaft.pdf (identifying CITES and the Montreal Protocol as non-
discriminatory). 
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states to act quickly to use trade as a shield against suspected illegal ac-
tivity that is not being regulated by a flag state.145 
As a result, parties to the PSMA, irrespective of various efforts of 
the RFMOs, should contemplate adopting domestic implementation leg-
islation for the PSMA that: (1) requires trade documentation certificates 
before accepting landing of fisheries products, and (2) allows parties to 
unilaterally close access to their domestic markets to IUU fish sales 
where trade documentation is either inadequate or suspected as fraudu-
lent. In the case of the United States, these additions to any implementing 
legislation for the PSMA would greatly strengthen a legislative frame-
work that directly contemplates the use of market closures.146 
D. Trade Documentation Schemes and Customs Codes 
Fish and other seafood have become fungible commodities with in-
creasingly complex delivery chains. As the 2014 FAO report on the sta-
tus of global fisheries notes, fisheries products “may well cross national 
boundaries several times before final consumption.” 147  For example, 
Russian fish that are sent to China for processing to be exported to the 
European Union are listed for trade purposes as Chinese fish filets.148 
While this may be the correct approach, based on existing trade rules that 
require the country of origin to be China if a product increases 40% in 
value from the processing, it also eliminates significant information for 
understanding the trade flows of fishery products.149 
Historically, processing used to take place in the state that harvest-
ed the fish or in the state that was consuming the fish. Today, due to de-
creases in transportation costs and savings on labor, a sizable amount of 
fish are being processed by countries that neither harvest the fish nor 
consume the fish—third-country processors.150 This situation creates an 
increased opportunity for fraud with the addition of numerous interven-
tion points. For example, seafood companies located in states from which 
                                                        
 145. While there are working meetings throughout the year, RFMOs generally have one annual 
meeting of the Commission at which organizational decisions are made. 
 146. The United States already has the power to impose trade sanctions on foreign states for 
violations of conservation measures. See, e.g., Pelly Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1999). Under 
the Pelly Amendment, the President may impose trade sanctions by ordering the United States Trade 
Representative to prohibit imports of wildlife related products from a country whose nationals have 
been determined to be diminishing the effectiveness of any international program to protect endan-
gered or threatened species. See id. 
 147. FAO, STATE OF THE WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE, supra note 6, at 46. 
 148. CLARKE & HOSCH, supra note 123, at 5. 
 149. Id. at 5 & n.3. 
 150. FAO, STATE OF THE WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE, supra note 6, at 46. 
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the fish originated may be duped if third-country processors “dilute” 
their fish quality by adding low quality fish that cannot easily be distin-
guished in filet form to the other processed fish in return shipments. 
Third-country processors could also mix illegally obtained seafood with 
legally obtained seafood of the same species as a means of “laundering” 
into the market fish that might not otherwise be acceptable for import. In 
addition, some seafood companies might work in collusion with third-
country processors to “dilute” the legality of a catch by mixing IUU fish 
catches with legal fish catches, thereby increasing potential profits. 
Traceability has become an increasing concern for countries such as 
the United States that are concerned about food safety. Recent reports 
suggest that a relatively large quantity of fish have been mislabeled at the 
point of sale.151 The U.S. government is investigating the source of mis-
labeling.152 Whether the mislabeled fish was legally harvested is likely to 
be unknown because available documentation regarding the trade fish is 
likely to be for a different species than the actual fish. 
In order to counter potentially fraudulent practices associated with 
trade, an increasing need exists to accurately track the chain of custody 
from ocean to plate in a way that ensures no mixing of legal and illegal 
products. Some privately led initiatives, such as the Marine Stewardship 
Council, are promoting traceability efforts.153 In light of the need for port 
state measures to be harmonized at some level across states, a single uni-
form practice for creating chain of custody documentation becomes even 
more important for a state in determining whether to potentially seize an 
illegal cargo to prevent it from entering the channels of trade. While the 
Marine Stewardship Council, with its third-party verification, may be-
come the gold standard in the industry, this is an important subject for 
negotiation among all FAO members that desire to have trade-related 
measures as part of their port state measures. The last work by the FAO 
on this topic is from 2009 and does not reflect any coordination with the 
adoption of port state measures.154 Presently, there is a proliferation of 
                                                        
 151. See OCEANA, OCEANA STUDY REVEALS SEAFOOD FRAUD NATIONWIDE (2011), available 
at http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/National_Seafood_Fraud_Testing_Results_Highlights_FINAL.pdf. 
 152. Recommendations of the Presidential Task Force on Combating Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud, 79 Fed. Reg. 75536 (2014). 
 153. MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, MSC CHAIN OF CUSTODY STANDARD ( 2011), available 
at http://www.msc.org/documents/scheme-documents/msc-standards/msc-coc-standard-v3. 
 154. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GUIDELINES FOR THE ECOLABELLING OF 
FISH AND FISHERY PRODUCTS FROM MARINE CAPTURE FISHERIES: REVISION 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1119t/i1119t.pdf. 
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traceability standards and no single opportunity to review custody chains 
that might reveal IUU fishing practices.155 
Trade documentation schemes become an increasingly important 
tool for assisting port officials in their efforts to identify potential IUU 
cargo. While a number of regional fisheries management organizations 
require some catch documentation, this documentation is not coordinated 
in a single, searchable database.156 Because the PSMA contemplates the 
exchange of information among states, the FAO, and RFMOs regarding 
port state measures, this information-sharing obligation could be imple-
mented by requiring states to exchange all available trade documentation 
related to the cargo on a particular vessel.157 It would be extremely valu-
able for chain of custody information to also be exchanged as part of the 
sharing of information needed by ports to make decisions.158 Each state 
could theoretically enact its own system of trade documentation, but ul-
timately coordination will be needed amongst all systems. 
In light of the size of the fisheries market in both the United States 
and the EU, the United States’ recent clear commitment to traceability, 
and the EU’s IUU regulation, the United States and the EU can set a re-
porting standard to be adopted by other states. For ease of coordination, 
the United States has been creating an electronic database to store trade-
related information for exports of certain highly migratory species.159 A 
similar effort would be appropriate for imports into U.S. ports in order to 
improve traceability. 
Implementing legislation for the PSMA should require vessels to 
provide traceability information of their cargo. Preferably, traceability 
information would be reported in a uniform fashion to make it easier for 
national enforcement officials to cooperate and coordinate with other 
states. A pattern of incomplete traceability information associated with 
                                                        
 155 . See VINCENT ANDRE, FAO SUBCOMM. ON FISH TRADE, REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF 
CURRENT TRACEABILITY PRACTICES (2013), http://www.fao.org/cofi/39777-03016d7904191838c6 
7f5d7da55b3430f.pdf. 
 156. See COMM’N FOR THE CONSERVATION OF SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA, RESOLUTION ON 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CCSBT CATCH DOCUMENTATION SCHEME (2014), available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/operational_resolutions/Resolution_CDS.pdf; Blue-
fin Tuna Catch Documentation Scheme, INT’L COMMISSION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC 
TUNA, https://www.iccat.int/en/BCD.asp (last visited May 2, 2015). The Western and Central Pacif-
ic Fisheries Commission is also exploring the possibility of implementing a catch documentation 
scheme. Catch Documentation Scheme Intersessional Working Group 2014, W. & CENT. PAC. 
FISHERIES COMMISSION, https://www.wcpfc.int/node/19850 (last visited May 2, 2015). 
 157. See PSMA, supra note 5, at art. 6. 
 158. See id. 
 159. NOAA Bluefin Tuna Catch Document System, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/noaabcd/external/ (last visited May 2, 2015). 
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certain states may give rise to the need for unilateral or multilateral mar-
ket closures. 
E. Market Closures 
The PSMA framework provides a baseline for states, it does not 
provide a ceiling. As Article 4 indicates, states may “adopt more strin-
gent port measures than those provided for in this Agreement.”160 
Mandated traceability provides the first step to determine whether a 
given cargo was obtained illegally. If the cargo is deemed to have been 
obtained illegally, or there is pattern of a repeat lack of enforcement by a 
flag state, parties to the PSMA must be able to act quickly and inde-
pendently of RFMO actions to be able to restrict trade on fishery prod-
ucts originating from particular regions or processed in certain countries. 
Simply closing a port for landing from fishing or transport vessels as the 
PSMA contemplates will not be sufficient to combat the preexisting 
problems of ports of convenience because IUU fishing products can still 
be laundered into the markets of states who are parties to the PSMA. 
Unilateral trade actions have generally been condemned because 
they have the potential to violate WTO principles of most-favored-nation 
treatment and nondiscrimination. Yet sometimes, achieving the objec-
tives of a multilateral environmental agreement such as the PSMA may 
require unilateral action.161 Flag states have argued in the past that the 
unilateral closure of a port violates trade provisions under WTO rules. 
However, the WTO has never decided the legality of closing a port for 
alleged conservation purposes.162 
The text of the PSMA makes no specific allusion to the availability 
of market closures as a means to combat IUU fishing, but the availability 
of market closure can be inferred. In most cases, while states are not 
permitted to place import embargos on goods, IUU fish are not ordinary 
goods.163 Because IUU fish are more akin to narcotics and contraband, 
extraordinary domestic measures can be implemented to prevent trade in 
                                                        
 160. PSMA, supra note 5, at art. 4. 
 161. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶¶ 3.12–3.14, 
WT/DS29/R (June 16, 1994), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/ 
tunadolphinII.pdf.download#page=1 (The United States argued that some multilateral environmental 
agreements may require unilateral trade restrictive action to achieve environmental objectives). 
 162. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 
[hereinafter GATT]; Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Chile—Measures 
Affecting the Transit and Importing of Swordfish, WT/DS193/1 (Apr. 19, 2000) (EU argued that 
Chile had created an illegal trade restriction when Chile closed its ports to EU vessels because of 
alleged violations of conservation and management measures). 
 163. GATT, supra note 162, at art. 11. 
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these fish products. If properly implemented, market closures could be a 
particularly potent tool for regulating trade in IUU fish because these 
closures would make it more expensive for IUU fishing operations to 
reach their desired destinations. If closed markets force fishing vessels to 
offload in another continent, thereby slowing the entrance of the fish into 
the stream of commerce, IUU fishing may become less attractive as a 
revenue-generating activity for all but the most profitable products, such 
as sushi-grade tuna, crab, and abalones. 
One mechanism that should be explored in conjunction with PMSA 
implementation is for parties to the Agreement to assert pressure on non-
compliant flag states by prohibiting trade in fisheries products with prob-
lematic states. The CITES Secretariat used this approach when it re-
quested treaty-parties to end trade in wildlife and wildlife products with 
Thailand until Thailand responded to address its illicit trade problem.164 
It might also be possible for existing parties to the PSMA to end 
any trade in fish products with states that are not parties to PSMA and 
cannot demonstrate domestic port state measures that are equivalent to 
the measures being implemented by parties under the Agreement. The 
PSMA implicitly contemplates this possibility in Article 23 when it 
states: “Parties shall take fair, non-discriminatory and transparent 
measures consistent with this Agreement and other applicable interna-
tional law to deter the activities of non-Parties which undermine the ef-
fective implementation of this Agreement.”165 The justification for such a 
closure would be that the failure of third-party states to participate in the 
agreement undermines the objective and purpose of the treaty to elimi-
nate IUU fishing. Thus, as long as ports of convenience continue to exist 
as alternative landing sites, and thereby undermine the application of 
strict port measures, the PSMA cannot be adequately implemented with-
out either trade-specific measures or some reference to trade relations.166 
Market closures under implementing legislation for the PSMA 
would be particularly appropriate for species where scientific data indi-
cates that a given species is severely overfished and not likely to recover 
quickly. For example, Atlantic bluefin tuna are currently reported to be at 
risk of depletion. Regenerating stocks of bluefin tuna will require time 
since mature tuna do not begin to spawn until they are 8–12 years old 
                                                        
 164. CITES Secretariat Notification to the Parties No. 636, Thailand Ban on CITES Trade, 
(Apr. 22, 1991), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/notif/2014.php. 
 165. PSMA, supra note 5, at art. 23. 
 166. Other treaty regimes such as the Montreal Protocol have allowed for states to eliminate 
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1266 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:1237 
and they only spawn once a year.167 Bigeye and yellowfin tuna stocks 
from the western central Pacific Ocean may also be overfished.168 
However, while market closures for noncomplying states that fail to 
provide adequate trade documentation or for highly overfished species 
are viable options for implementing the PSMA, states that link market 
closures to port measures must be prepared to respond to leakages in the 
market. When vessels are no longer permitted in certain ports, they will 
attempt to deliver their cargo to ports of convenience that may welcome 
additional business. In the short term, these noncooperating states may 
reap financial benefits because the mechanisms for closing markets rely 
on appropriate due process and are slow to respond. For example, the EU 
closed its market almost three years after notifying Sri Lanka that the EU 
suspected that country of supporting IUU fishing.169 
In order to address the problems with leakage, domestic implemen-
tation of the PSMA requires a uniform approach across a given region. In 
some instances, RFMOs offer harmonized regional responses such as the 
former ICCAT restrictions on bluefin tuna landings by vessels from Be-
lize, Honduras, or Panama. But there are still numerous regions and fish-
eries where explicit trade restrictions have not been considered as a strat-
egy to respond to known IUU fishing practices.170 Regional cooperation 
will be essential under the PSMA for effective enforcement of port state 
measures, but the cooperation does not necessarily require the engage-
ment of an RFMO, even though this may be preferable in many instances. 
In an ideal world, an IUU fishing vessel or a vessel transshipping 
IUU fish products would not be able to find a berth, but this reality is 
unlikely to be realized in the near future. In the meantime, if PSMA par-
ties were to harmonize their port enforcement fishery laws to require 
traceability and to enable market closures, there may be very real oppor-
tunities to focus resources on IUU enforcement efforts in more concen-
trated geographical areas. 
                                                        
 167. Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/ 
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F. Potential Conflicts with Existing Trade Law Measures 
Any application of port state measures will be “interpreted and ap-
plied in conformity with international law,” which would include interna-
tional trade law negotiated within the framework of the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO).171 
Closure of a market or imposition of a required customs coding 
would not violate existing obligations under existing trade treaties as 
long as these measures are applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion.172 The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contemplates that 
WTO members can apply measures to promote conservation as long as 
they do not create “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised re-
striction on international trade.”173 
The existing PSMA and any implementing legislation providing for 
trade-related measures should survive legal scrutiny because the agree-
ment focuses on identifying vessels engaged in any IUU fishing versus 
vessels engaged in legal fishing. Any trade-related measures would also 
be supported under GATT Article XX’s exception, including Article 
XX(d)’s exception for measures necessary to secure compliance with 
“the prevention of deceptive practices,” and Article XX(g)’s exception 
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.”174 The PSMA, as a treaty, raises some mi-
nor questions about the differential treatment, for purposes of inspection, 
of foreign-flagged vessels and nationally flagged vessels. The inference 
is that states that become members to the PSMA will also be regulating 
their nationally flagged vessels for IUU fishing activity, though there is 
no requirement that the same measures be applied to both foreign vessels 
and nationally flagged vessels.175 
U.S. participation in the PSMA is significant not only because it 
should support conservation objectives, but because U.S. participation 
also defuses any concerns about U.S. port closure practices creating trade 
barriers. As noted above, the United States already closes most of its 
                                                        
 171. PSMA, supra note 5, at art. 4(4). 
 172. Bertrand Le Gallic, The Use of Trade Measures Against Illicit Fishing: Economic and 
Legal Considerations, 64(4) ECOLOGICAL ECON. 858, 865 (2008). 
 173. GATT, supra note 162, at art. XX. 
 174. Id. at art. XX(d), (g). 
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ing and fishing related activities in support of such fishing as measures applied to” foreign vessels.). 
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ports to landings from foreign-flagged vessels.176 This legislation might 
be open to a potential trade challenge. While ports are within the territo-
rial waters of a state, and access to ports has been considered a privilege 
for states,177 states that are unhappy with the practice of closing access to 
vessels hoping to land fish for a domestic market might be in a position 
to argue that laws closing port access run afoul of the National Treatment 
provisions under GATT.178 
A state claiming injury may also be able to argue for a most-
favored-nation violation if the United States grants RFMO members dif-
ferent access to the ports than that granted to other non-RFMO mem-
bers.179 Even if the United States or Canada—which has similar port 
closing laws—were to survive a GATT challenge by relying on Article 
XX(d) and (g), each state would still have the potentially onerous burden 
of proving the necessity to close its ports to foreign-flagged vessels that 
intend to supply a particular market. 
When a state closes its ports and potentially creates a barrier to a 
market, the burden would be on the state to prove that there are legiti-
mate conservation concerns related to the particular species that a vessel 
was planning on introducing into the channels of trade. A recent case 
involving the European Union and the Faroe Islands raised potential 
trade law questions about when a state can close its market. While the 
parties ultimately settled their dispute independently of the WTO, the 
Faroe Islands brought a case against the EU to challenge the EU’s clo-
sure of its markets to Faroe Island mackerel and Atlanto-Scandian her-
ring.180 The EU claimed in August 2013, that the Faroe Islands fleet was 
fishing unsustainably when it unilaterally increased its harvest of herring 
and mackerel. Specifically, the Faroe Islands challenged the EU action as 
discriminating under most-favored-nation treatment, GATT Article V on 
Freedom of Transit, and quantitative restrictions on trade.181 This case 
                                                        
 176. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
 177. See, e.g., ORG. OF ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., FISHERIES SERVICES: CANADA, available 
at http://www.oecd.org/canada/39926170.pdf (last visited May 2, 2015) (“[A]ccess is a privilege that 
the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans may choose to grant in accordance with the provisions of the 
Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations.”). 
 178. “National treatment” under the WTO prohibits a state from using government regulations 
to discriminate between imported and domestically produced goods. See generally Principles of the 
Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2 
_e.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
 179. The “most favored nation” principle under the WTO requires that a state not discriminate 
between its trading partners. Id. 
 180. Request for Consultations by Denmark in Respect of Faroe Islands, European Union—
Measures on Atlanto-Scandian Herring, WT/DS469/1 (Nov. 7, 2013). 
 181. Id. 
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suggests that a “wronged” state might be willing to bring a trade dispute 
to reopen markets.182 These disputes are unlikely to be successful for 
suspected IUU fishing products given the preexisting history of market 
closures to combat IUU fishing, the justification under GATT Article 
XX, and the support for the PSMA by a number of key fishing import 
states. 
It is important that states attempt to harmonize some level of prac-
tice in applying port state measures. A broad challenge of a series of port 
state measures adopted across an RFMO would likely survive judicial 
scrutiny under the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement as part 
of a newly emerging international standard as long as the RFMO is open 
to WTO members.183 If a single state under Article 4 implements “more 
stringent port measures than those provided for” in the PSMA, such as 
closing all ports to flags of convenience or prohibiting landings by for-
eign-flagged vessels, it may be possible for a state to launch a TBT claim, 
though past case law suggests that conservation-related trade measures 
that are limited in scope to ending IUU fishing activities are likely to be 
considered legitimate trade measures.184 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The PSMA offers a unique opportunity to combat the chronic prob-
lems with lax flag state enforcement of vessels engaged in IUU fishing. 
Nearly universal adoption of the PSMA will be necessary to end the 
practice of ports of convenience. In the meantime, while states are 
weighing the pros and cons of becoming a party to the PSMA, those 
states that adopt the PSMA should also consider adopting trade-related 
measures, including rules requiring trade-related documentation and cus-
toms coding. Basic transparency will not be easy to achieve in the fishing 
industry, but the future of sustainable fisheries depends on taking a holis-
tic approach to combatting IUU fishing. 
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As this Article goes to press, several IUU vessels are fishing in 
Antarctic waters that are believed to be linked to Vidal Armadores, a 
Spanish fishing syndicate with a history of illegal fishing.185 Will the 
“sea bass” cargo on these ships become dinner in a U.S. restaurant after 
being potentially transshipped at sea under the cover of darkness? Ulti-
mately, the answer will depend on the traceability of this cargo, the will-
ingness of states to investigate vessels in port, and the ability of states to 
unilaterally or jointly close their markets. 
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